In this article, we examine the notion that perceptions of strong influence of
, and preparations for Y2K (Tewksbury, Moy, & Weis, 2004) . Taken together, this literature points out that people act on their perceptions of media influence, regardless of whether these perceptions are accurate. Gunther and Storey (2003) called this process "the influence of presumed influence."
In this article, we test the influence of presumed influence proposition in the realm of democratic legitimacy and violent protest. We examine the notion that perceptions of strong influence of biased media coverage may lead to an increased willingness to resort to violent protest. In other words, perceiving that democratic decisions are swayed by unfair media coverage may lead members of politically oppositional groups, threatened by these decisions, to justify the use of violence. We investigate this idea in the dramatic context of Jewish settlers in the Gaza Strip and their reactions to the May 2004 Likud Party members' referendum on Prime Minister's Ariel Sharon's disengagement plan.
Settlers in the Gaza Strip and Ariel

Sharon's Disengagement Plan
Heavily populated by Palestinians (currently exceeding 1.3 million, according to the "The Gaza Strip,", 2004) , the Gaza Strip was conquered by Israel from Egypt during the 1967 war. Jewish Israelis settled the Gaza Strip, as they did the West Bank, in 21 small settlements, which at present are occupied by some 7,000 settlers. Established by right-wing groups and Israeli governments, beginning in the 1970s, these settlements were created to fulfill geo-political and ideological goals. Although the settlement movement originally enjoyed widespread support by Israeli public opinion, including parts of the political elite, its relationship with Israeli governments, Likud and Labor, has oftentimes been strained (Sprinzak, 1985) . Beginning in the 1980s, and especially during the 1990s, the settlements were at the heart of heated political debates in Israel. They were presented by parts of the Israeli left (including cabinet ministers) as a burden rather than an asset to Israel's image and prospects of peace, as a financial drain, and as a reason for many of Israel's problems. In the context of this debate, the settlers have come to be regarded in Israeli public opinion as socially and politically peripheral (though oftentimes unproportionally politically powerful), and their image is associated with manifestations of political extremism and violence against their Arab neighbors.
Coverage of the settlements in mainstream media has focused on "disorder news" (Avraham, 2001) . Using quantitative content analysis, Avraham (2003) demonstrated that the issues most frequently covered had to do with the Israeli-Arab conflict, attacks on Palestinians, political extremism, and conflicts with Israeli governments (pp. 137-139) . The coverage disregarded other aspects of life in the settlements, such as economic developments, industry, and culture. Journalists treat settlers as the "others," using us versus them terms, and presenting residents of the settlements as having different characteristics from mainstream Israelis (Avraham, 2003, pp. 114-125) . Media coverage often described the settlements as a lawless "Wild West" that does not contribute to society. As Avraham (2001) maintained the settlers were blamed for everything bad, as negatively affecting "all of us" in all aspects of our lives, as different from the public at large . . . there was no tendency among most editors and journalists to adopt the group's point of view, or even its terminology for its name, the name of the area it lives in and so on. (p. 124)
The disengagement plan was proposed by the Sharon government in December 2003 as a response to increasing international pressure to advance the peace process, and because of the government's conviction that no deal was possible with the current Palestinian leadership. The plan included unilaterally withdrawing the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) from the Gaza Strip after removing 1,600 families from the settlements within this area. According to Sharon, the disengagement was meant to decrease the friction between the Palestinian population and the settlers and army personnel who were stationed in the area to protect the settlers. The plan was also meant to decrease international pressure on Israel, alleviate the financial burden of securing the settlements, and provide a testing ground for the feasibility of Palestinian sovereignty. In essence, it would provide the Palestinians with a small area (360 sq. km.) in which they would be free of Israeli occupation while alleviating political pressure on Israel to withdraw from other occupied territories.
Sharon was pressured into taking the plan to a referendum among 193,000 registered Likud Party members by senior Likud politicians and settlers, who argued that it represented a break from the Party's traditional hawkish policy. The settlers and their supporters campaigned against it, canvassing door-to-door, protesting and calling on Likud members to vote against the plan, which they named "the expulsion plan." The plan enjoyed widespread support among the Israeli public at the time of study, and, up until April 29 (3 days before the referendum), opinion polls conducted among potential referendum voters and published in the Israeli media predicted that Sharon's plan had a solid majority among Likud members. The April 29 surveys predicted a majority of voters would oppose disengagement at the polls; and eventually, Sharon failed to gain the support of a majority of his party members at the polls.
While, as noted earlier, coverage of the settlements in mainstream in the Israeli media tends to be negative, a content analysis of the coverage of the debate over the disengagement plan, in the weeks preceding the May 2 referendum, showed that that coverage was relatively evenhanded. Sheafer (2005) content analyzed 534 news and editorial items that discussed the disengagement plan or the referendum, published in the three leading Israeli newspapers between March 30, 2004 and May 2, 2004 . Results of his analysis showed a relatively balanced news treatment with Sharon and his plan enjoying slightly more positive coverage in the earlier stages of the campaign, and his opponents enjoying more supportive coverage in the past week.
Data for the current investigation were collected among Gaza settlers in the days leading up to the Likud party referendum. Most respondents were interviewed before the polls predicting the plan's failure were published. All of the settlers were interviewed under rather extreme conditions of uncertainty, while faced with the threat of being removed from their homes. It was in this atmosphere that we examined the influence of presumed media influence on the settlers' willingness to accept, or intention to violently resist, a possible evacuation.
Political Violence and Violent Protest
Research tracking the roots of political violence can generally be divided (following Pedahzur & Canetti-Nisim, 2003) to personality theories, which stress the role of personality factors and personal background in political violence; primordial theories, which depict violence as the result of the cultural barriers between civilizations that hinder the possibility of peaceful resolutions to social conflicts; and sociocognitive theories, which emphasize the role of subjective social cognitions and perceptions. The latter group of theories are our focus in this article. The most important line of research within the social-cognitive tradition stems from Ted Gurr's (1970) theory of relative deprivation, which argues that violent protest arises from dissatisfaction and frustration with a specific situation, and mainly from the belief-based on social comparison to other groups or individuals-that an individual or a group are entitled to receive more substantive and symbolic resources than they are currently getting. As a social-cognitive theory, relative deprivation stresses the subjectivity and perceptual dimension of this social comparison and emphasizes that such comparisons do not necessarily have to be anchored in reality. Pedahzur, Hasisi, and Brichta (2000) suggested that political illegitimacy, and not perceptions of relative deprivation per se, is the factor affecting violent protest, and especially support of violent protest at the individual level. According to their reasoning, a sense of illegitimacy has to mediate between perceptions of relative deprivation and support of violence. Some people may feel that their deprivation is justified given external circumstances, or that the current government is doing enough to correct the situation. It is only relative deprivation that leads to a sense of political illegitimacy that has the potential of translating to violence. This focus on illegitimacy is in line with classical political science literature depicting legitimacy as a central component of democratic stability (Lipset, 1960) .
However, despite realizing the importance of subjective perceptions, scholars studying the sociocognitive sources of support for violence have neglected to examine their antecedents. Part of what shapes such perceptions of the illegitimacy of the democratic process has to do with media processes. Because media are supposed to function as an unbiased source of political information, allowing citizens to form reasoned political attitudes, any perceived bias in the media may compromise the perceived legitimacy of the political process. Hence, when people feel that news media coverage is biased against their group, and that this coverage has an excessive influence on their public image, and hence, on democratic decisions, they may feel that the democratic process is unfair and, as a result, illegitimate. In addition, a feeling that the public cannot, because of biased media, hear the views that a group holds true (perhaps even self-evident), not only decreases the legitimacy of democratic decisions-seen as based on ignorance forced on the public by media sources -but also increases the frustration within a minority group. Thus, perceptions of strong effects of biased coverage might indirectly lead people to justify the use of political violence to resist democratic decisions (that are perceived as illegitimate decisions), and consequently, even to violently resist these decisions.
From a communication perspective, political violence is often depicted as a backdoor entrance to politics; that is, as a tactic used by the relatively unnewsworthy to attract the attention of the news media to achieve political goals (e.g., Weimann & Winn, 1994) . However, this approach does not explain why newsworthy groups, already enjoying substantial attention, may resort to violence. Applying the notion of "the influence of presumed media influence" in this context suggests another path through which perceptions of news coverage might affect violent political protest, given research about the importance of illegitimacy in support and justification of violence.
Political Inefficacy
Besides investigating the indirect effect of perceptions of media influence on support of political violence through perceived public image, we also explore whether this process affects the settlers' sense of political efficacy and inefficacy. Campbell, Gurin, and Warren (1954) When people feel news media coverage is biased against their group and ideology, and does not provide them with a fair opportunity to convince the public that they are right; and further, when they feel that the public is influenced by such coverage to endorse erroneous political decisions, they may feel politically powerless and inefficacious. This proposition is in line with research demonstrating the rational basis of political efficacy and its anchor in environmental conditions (such as past success, being in the majority, etc.; see Madsen, 1987; Tsfati, 1999) .
Media research on the "persuasive press influence" (e.g., Gunther, 1998; Gunther & Christen, 1999; Gunther, Christen, Liebhart, & Chia, 2001) indicates that third-person perceptions influence climate of opinion perceptions (Gunther, 1998) . According to this theory, people think that what the media say today has an influence on what the distribution of public opinion will be tomorrow. Members of unfavorably covered groups, perceiving the strong influence of this coverage, should perceive themselves as having lower chances of persuading the general population, according to this theory. When people think that the odds are stacked against them this way, they should, in turn, feel less politically efficacious.
2 Thus, perceptions of strong media influence on the image of unfavorably depicted political groups should result in higher political inefficacy.
Residential Mobility Thoughts
An additional outcome of the indirect effect of presumed media influence is the settlers' residential mobility intentions. This is in keeping with research documenting such effects of presumed media influence on residents of peripheral development towns in Israel, suffering from negative media coverage (Tsfati & Cohen, 2003) . The psychological explanation for this process is derived from Tajfel and Turner's (1986) social identity theory. Because we are likely to desire to dissociate ourselves from groups with low social status, believing that media foster a negative image of a group we belong to may create a desire to dissociate ourselves from it, when mobility is an option. Thus, another possible result of settlers' perceptions of strong effects of their negative media coverage is an intention to leave the settlements, which paradoxically could be conceptualized as the exact opposite of the intention to violently resist the evacuation.
Hypotheses
In sum, based on research about the influence of presumed influence (Tsfati & Cohen, 2003) and on the persuasive press influence (Gunther, 1998), we hypothesize (Hypothesis 1) that among Gaza settlers, perception of media influence of the coverage of the settlements will affect perceptions of the image of the settlements in Israeli public opinion. Our second hypothesis is based on theories of political illegitimacy and support of political violence (e.g., Pedahzur et al., 2000) . It is hypothesized (Hypothesis 2) that perceived negative image of the settlements will influence the justification of violence, which will have an impact (Hypothesis 2a) on the actual intention to use violence to resist the possible evacuation.
Our third hypothesis is based on research demonstrating the relationship of political efficacy to variables such as past success and being in the majority (Madsen, 1987) . It is hypothesized (Hypothesis 3) that perceived negative image of the settlements will influence settlers' sense of political inefficacy. Our final hypothesis (Hypothesis 4), based on research on presumed media influence in the realm of residential mobility intentions (Tsfati & Cohen, 2003) , predicts that the negativity of the settlements' perceived image will influence settlers' desire to relocate.
Method
Sample
The data for the current study were collected by the University of Haifa Survey Research Center, using telephone surveys conducted during the last weeks of April 2004. The sampling base consisted of all 1,267 households in the Jewish settlements in the Gaza Strip, listed in the Bezeq phone directories at the time of survey. The list of phone numbers was randomly ordered, and each household for which there was no answer was replaced by the next household. Fifteen attempts were made to contact each household, in case of a busy line or no answer. This procedure was employed until a predetermined quota of interviews was completed. Within households, adults older than age 17 years were selected, attempting to balance men and women. Interviews were conducted in Hebrew. American Association for Public Opinion Research's response rate was RR1 = .52.
The sample consisted of 413 individuals. The average age of respondents was 36 years (SD = 11.96), 57% of whom were female. In terms of religiosity, the self-reported distribution was approximately 67% religious, 18% secular, and 9% traditional (the rest did not report their religiosity). Most (60.5%) classified themselves as Mizrahi by origin (Jews of Asian or North African descent), 29.2% were of Ashkenazi origin (European origin), and the rest were of mixed ethnic backgrounds. On average, respondents had 14.81 years of education (SD = 4.38) and had been living in the Gaza strip for 13.14 years (SD = 7.01).
Measures
Intention to violently resist a possible evacuation. The item measuring intentions to use force to resist the possible evacuation was worded "If they come to evacuate me from my home, I will use force to resist." Response categories ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The item had a mean of 2.20 and a standard deviation of 1.63.
Justification of the use of force was measured using a single item, worded (following Pedahzur et al., 2000) "When a political disaster is about to occur, and all other means of protest have been exhausted and proven futile, violent action might be justified." Response categories again ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The item had a mean of 1.80 and a standard deviation of 1.35.
Political inefficacy. Political inefficacy was measured using an item worded "As an individual, I do not have much impact on the political process," with answer categories ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The item had a mean of 2.99 and a standard deviation of 1.62.
Residential mobility thoughts. Three Likert-type items were designed to measure the extent to which respondents were committed to continue living in the Gaza Strip settlements. Respondents were asked to agree or disagree with the statements: "If I were offered fair compensation, I would be willing to leave the Gaza Strip," "In recent years I have considered or I am currently considering leaving the Gaza Strip", and "I would like my children to continue living in the Gaza Strip" (reverse coded). Response categories ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Residential mobility thoughts were modeled as a latent factor influencing these three indicators. Exploratory factor analysis (principal axis, oblique) showed that the three items loaded on a single factor explaining 70% of the variance. Cronbach's alpha for the items was .85 (M = 1.50, SD = 1.06).
Perceived image of the Gaza settlements.
What settlers thought about how the Israeli public perceived Gaza settlements was measured as a latent variable influencing five indicators. The indicators were again Likert-type survey items, with answer categories ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Items asked whether respondents thought that the Israeli public "admires the settlers' resilience" (reversed), "thinks that the settlements in Gaza worsen Israel's security," "thinks that the settlers in the Gaza Strip live at their (the public's) expense," "thinks that security problems in the Gaza Strip are worse compared to other places in Israel," and thinks that the "settlements in Gaza have a negative image." Exploratory factor analysis (principal axis, oblique) showed the five items loaded on a single factor explaining 57% of the variance. Cronbach's alpha for the five items was .84 (M = 2.51, SD = 1.05).
Presumed media influence. Two items assessing perceived media influence were included. The first item asked "To what extent are you, yourself, affected by the way the settlements in Gaza are portrayed in the media?" (M = 1.58, SD = .94). The second was "To what extent is Israeli public opinion affected by the way the settlements in Gaza are portrayed in the media?" (M = 4.01, SD = .98). In line with third-person effect research, the difference in means between the items was highly significant (t = 35.54, df = 397, p < .001).
Perception of negative media coverage. The settlers' perceptions regarding media coverage of the settlements were measured using six items. Settlers were asked to respond to the following statements: "The media address only the negative aspects of the settlements in Gaza without mentioning the positive ones," "The media present Gaza settlers as more extreme than they really are," "The media overrepresent security problems in the Gaza settlements," "The media exaggerate when presenting the cost of Gaza settlements and their security to the national budget," "The media downplay the importance of the settlements in Gaza to the security of the state of Israel," and "The media present people living in the Gaza settlements as though they were all the same." Answer categories ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Perception of negative coverage was constructed as a latent variable influencing these items (Cronbach's alpha = .73, M = 4.29, SD = .74).
News media exposure. Four items measured the frequency with which respondents were exposed to television news, radio news, Internet news, and daily newspapers. Response categories ranged from 1 (never) to 5 (every day). The reliability estimate for the three items was low (alpha = .35), and they did not load together in exploratory factor analysis. Therefore, the four items were entered to the model separately, as observed variables (for the newspapers item: M = 3.27, S = 1.48; for television: M = 2.86, SD = 1.72; for the radio: M = 2.03, SD = 1.50; and for online news: M = 3.70, SD = 1.62).
Covariates. As explained above, the tendency to justify and ultimately use political violence is affected not only by people's perceptions of the unfair image of the settlements but also by various demographic and ideological beliefs, as are political inefficacy and residential mobility thoughts. Thus, our model controlled for a variety of factors, including non-democratic beliefs ("I would be interested in a government that would lead in the right direction, even if it is not democratic": M = 2.33, SD = .98, on a 1-to-5 scale), religious, antidemocratic ideology ("Rabbis' opinions are no less important than those of the political leadership": M = 3.87, SD = 1.59), belief in the importance of settling the entire land of Israel ("Without the right to settle in all parts of the land of Israel, there is no point to the existence of an independent Jewish state": M = 3.28, SD = 1.77), and logical arguments against the disengagement plan ("If the Gaza Strip is evacuated, terrorism will only increase": M = 4.63, SD = 1.01). Also included in the model were variables representing respondents' involvement in, and attachment to, their settlements, known as predictors of mobility thoughts: "To what extent do you like living in . . . (your settlement)?": M = 4.83, SD = .55; "To what extent do you feel you belong in . . . ?": M = 4.01, SD = .98; "I have many friends in the Gaza Strip settlements": M = 4.75, SD = .04, all measured on a 1-to-5 scale), and the number of years respondents had been living in the Gaza Strip (M = 13.14, SD = 7.01). These items did not scale together and, hence, were entered into the model separately.
Model Specification
The structure of the model is presented in Figure 1 . In accordance with standard representation, we depicted the observed variables as rectangles and the latent variables as ovals. For simplification purposes, indicators influenced by the latent variables, error terms and covariances between exogenous variables were omitted from the figure. 3 The model allows for all correlations between exogenous variables. The endogenous variables in the model are perceived influence on self and others, perceived image of the settlements, residential mobility thoughts (RMT), political inefficacy, justification for the use of political violence, and intention to use violence to resist the possible evacuation. Guided by past findings on third-person perceptions (Cohen, Mutz, Price, & Gunther, 1988; Gunther & Storey, 2003; Perloff, 1989) we modeled the perceived influence on self and others items as endogenous variables affected by perceptions of negative coverage.
In accordance with Hypothesis 1, and following the logic of the "persuasive press inference," perceived image of the settlements was modeled as a function of presumed media influence on public opinion in Israel. Following Gunther (1998), this equation also contains a direct path from perceived negative coverage to perceived image. To account for possible direct media effects, the equation for perceived image also controls for the measures of news media exposure.
In accordance with Hypothesis 2, justification of the use of force is modeled as a function of perceived image. In accordance with Hypothesis 2a, this construct, in turn, affects intention to use violence. The remaining endogenous variables, political inefficacy and RMT, were modeled as a function of the settlements' perceived image, in accordance with Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4, respectively.
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Justification of the use of force Because our hypotheses imply mediational relationships between triads of variables, model building and trimming strategies (suggested by Kline, 1998, pp. 132-137) were used to examine the utility of including or excluding the mediational and direct paths in each triad. Results of this analysis, described at length in Appendix A, supported the exclusion of the paths for direct effects of perceived influence on others on justification of force, inefficacy and residential mobility thoughts. Similar analysis also supported the exclusion of a direct path from perceived negative image to intended use of force. It is interesting to point out that in all four triads, our analysis demonstrated an insignificant direct path from the independent to the dependent variables, with or without controls for the mediated effects. Although this stands in contrast to Baron and Kenny's (1986, p. 1177) requirements for mediation, current methodological literature acknowledges cases where mediation can take place even in the absence of a direct effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable (MacKinnon, Krull, & Lockwood, 2000) . 4 To assess the net effect of presumed media influence and perceived image, other variables potentially affecting the endogenous variables were included in the model: The equations predicting perceived image justification of the use of violence, intention to use violence, political inefficacy, and RMT all control for demographic variables, including secularity, age, education, and sex. These equations also control for the ideological variables, mentioned above. The equations predicting mobility thoughts, justification of the use of violence, and intended use of violence also control for the variables tapping attachment toward the settlements.
Results
Maximum likelihood estimates for the model were calculated using AMOS (Arbuckle, 1999) .
5 Figure 1 presents standardized estimates for the paths relevant for our discussion, and Table 1 presents unstandardized estimates and standard errors for these paths. Appendix B presents the results for the control variables. The model explains 45% of the variance in the perceived image of the settlements, 11% of the variance in justification of the use of violence, 17% of the variance in intentions to use violence and political inefficacy, and 78% of the variance in residential mobility thoughts. Goodness-of-fit estimates for this model were very satisfactory: the Bentler-Bonett's Normed Fit Index (NFI) was .97, the Tucker Lewis Index (TLI) was .98, and 1 -RMSEA was .955 (with a Confidence Interval varying between .945 and .954). The equations predicting perceived media influence on self and on public opinion at large demonstrate that the more respondents perceived media coverage of the settlements as negative, the less they felt personally influenced by this coverage (β = -.20, b = -.39, SE = .12), and the more they perceived public opinion to be affected by it (β = .18, b = .31, SE = .12). This is in line with research on the first-person and third-person effects.
The equation predicting the perceived image of the settlements demonstrates that this construct was significantly and positively predicted by the perceived effect on self (β = .09, b = .11, SE = .05), perceived negative coverage (β = .12, b = .26, SE = .11), and by television news exposure (β = .18, b = .18, SE = .04); that is, the more respondents were exposed to and felt influenced by news coverage, and the more they thought it was negative, the more they were likely to perceive Israeli public opinion regarding the settlements as negative. Younger (b = -.01, SE = .01; and this effect was only of borderline statistical significance), and female settlers tended to think the settlements suffer from a negative image (b = .20, SE = .09). Those who lived longer in the Gaza Strip (b = -.02, SE = .01), and had many friends in the settlements (b = -.23, SE = .07) perceived the image of the settlements to be more positive. Those preferring religious over political leadership (b = -.11, SE = .04), and those believing in Jews' right to settle the entire land of Israel (b = -.08, SE = .03) also showed a tendency to perceive a relatively positive image of the settlements.
Hypothesis 1 predicted that given the negative representation of the settlements in the Israeli media (Avraham, 2001) , perceptions of media effects on public opinion would predict the perceived image of the settlements. Controlling for perceived effect on self, media exposure, perceived negative coverage, and the demographic, ideological, and attachment to the settlements variables, there was a significant effect of presumed influence on others on the perceived image of the settlements (β = .18, b = .19, SE = .05); that is, the more respondents perceived media coverage of the settlements to have a stronger effect on public opinion, the more likely they were to perceive that the settlements had a negative image, controlling for all other covariates. In sum, Hypothesis 1 received support from the data.
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The equation predicting justification of violence demonstrated that this construct is significantly associated with nondemocratic beliefs (b = .10, SE = .05) and with belief in Jews' right to settle the entire land of Israel (b = .10, SE = .05). These variables also significantly predicted intention to use violence directly (nondemocratic beliefs: b = .10, SE = .05, and with belief in Jews' right to settle the entire land of Israel: b = .21, SE = .05), though in the case of nondemocratic beliefs the association was only borderline significant ( p = .06). Respondents believing that rabbis' opinions are not less important than the opinions of the political leadership were significantly more likely to report intentions to use violence to resist a possible evacuation (b = .19, SE = .07), and so were the younger respondents (b = -.02, SE = .01, though this effect was only borderline significant) and respondents who were more educated (b = .05, SE = .02). There was also a borderline significant and negative association between the number of years respondents had lived in the Gaza Strip and their justification of the use of violence (b = -.02, SE = .01), perhaps reflecting the more ideological inclinations of newcomers to the Gaza settlements in the post-Oslo years.
Hypothesis 2 predicted that over and above these factors, perceived negative image of the settlements would affect justification of the use of violence. Results demonstrate that this effect was indeed statistically significant (β = .16, b = .20, SE = .09, p < .05). The more people thought the settlements suffer from a problematic image, the more they were likely to agree with the "violence may be justified" statement. All other things being equal, this variable, in turn, affected intention to use violence to resist evacuation, as predicted by Hypothesis 2a, though this effect was only borderline significant (β = .10, b = .12, SE = .07, p = .07).
The equation predicting political inefficacy demonstrated that this variable was positively associated with nondemocratic beliefs (b = .15, SE = .05) and negatively associated with education (b = -.05, SE = .02). Hypothesis 3 predicted that political inefficacy would, beyond these and all other controls, be affected by the perceived image of the settlements. Results show that, as predicted by Hypothesis 3, even after controlling for ideological and demographic factors, the more settlers perceived the Gaza settlements to suffer from a problematic image among the Israeli public, the more they felt inefficacious. This effect was positive (β = .30, b = .45, SE = .09) and highly significant (p < .001).
The dependent variable in the last equation was residential mobility thoughts (RMT). Results for this equation demonstrate that secular respondents were more likely to consider relocation than religious respondents (b = .31, SE = .12). The more respondents valued rabbis' opinions in comparison to the opinions of the political leadership, the less likely they were to consider leaving the settlements (b = -.09, SE = .03). The more respondents believed in Jews' right to settle the entire land of Israel, the less likely they were to consider leaving (b = -.05, SE = .02). The more respondents thought the evacuation would only increase Palestinian terrorism, the lower their RMT scores (b = -.27, SE = .04).
As in previous research, mobility thoughts were negatively influenced by respondents' assessments of the quality of life in the settlements (b = -.35, SE = .07), and by their feeling that they belong in their place of residence (b = -.37, SE = .08). It is not surprising to note, the more respondents liked to live in the settlements, the less likely they were to consider leaving (b = -.26, SE = .10). Respondents having more friends in the Gaza Strip settlements were less likely to consider relocation, compared with respondents with less friends (b = -.09, SE = .05), though this effect was only of borderline statistical significance ( p = .079).
Mobility thoughts were influenced by these ideological, demographic, and life-satisfaction factors; however, even after controlling for the aforementioned factors, and in accordance with Hypothesis 4 and previous research (Tsfati & Cohen, 2003) , the perceived negative image of the settlements was positively associated with mobility thoughts; that is, the more respondents thought the settlements were negatively perceived by the Israeli public, the more likely they were to consider leaving the settlements (β = .12, b = .12, SE = .04, p < .01).
Our model contained indirect effects of perceived influence on others on three dependent variables. The Sobel test for the significance of indirect effects, the Goodman I, and the MacKinnon, Lockwood, and Hoffman (1998) tests were used to examine the possibility that these indirect effects (the products of the two coefficients for the mediational paths in each case) were statistically null. Results of these tests, presented in Table 2 , demonstrate that the indirect effects of perceived media influence on others on justification of the use of force, inefficacy, and mobility thoughts (all three through perceived negative image) are statistically significant effects. A test of the indirect effect of negative perceived image on the intended use of force, through the justification of force, found this effect was significant only when using the more statistically powerful MacKinnon et al. (1998) distribution of products test (recommended by Holbert & Stephenson, 2003) .
Finally, to examine the overall contribution of presumed influence and perceived image to the model, all paths from perceived image to the dependent variables were set to zero. In other words, a model predicting justification of force, inefficacy, and residential mobility thoughts without perceived image and its antecedents was estimated. In this model, the dependent variables are explained only by the control variables that are typically used in models predicting justification of political violence and extremism by Israeli political scientists (Pedahzur et al., 2000) . We evaluated the two competing models using the criteria of model fits, explained variances, and chi-square difference tests, following the strategy utilized by Cohen, Vigoda, and Samorly (2001) . As Table 3 shows, all indices indicated that our model performs better, in terms of fit, than the competing model. The explained variances in the dependent variables in our model were higher than those in the competing model (for justification of force R 2 = .11, compared to R 2 = .09; for inefficacy R 2 = .17, compared to R 2 = .10; and for mobility thoughts R 2 = .78, compared to R 2 = .77; explained variance in the fourth dependent variable in our model, intentions to use force, remained the same in both models R 2 = .17). Finally, the chi-square difference test (χ 2 = 36.08, df = 3) was statistically significant (p < .001), supporting the retention of the three theoretical paths.
In sum, our model performed better in all three criteria than a competing model that does not include paths representing our Hypothesis 2, Hypothesis 809 Tsfati, Cohen • Presumed Influence and Democratic Legitimacy Notes: Similar tests were performed on the simplified models presented in Appendix B and the patterns of results were identical. The Sobel and Goodman tests were calculated using Preacher & Leonardelli (2003) . The MacKinnon et al. test was calculated using the instructions from Holbert & Stephenson (2003) . *p ≤ .05. **p ≤ .01. ***p ≤ .001.
3, and Hypothesis 4. As MacCallum (2003) argued, all statistical models are literally wrong. While, obviously, our model is imperfect, and while we cannot rule out the possibility that other models may fit the data as well, or even better, we believe that our analysis demonstrates that our model provides a better fit to the data than models offered by political scientists studying justification of political violence, and demographers studying residential mobility, without considering the role of mass media.
Discussion
Findings from the settlers' data indicate support for key relationships and the theoretical premises in the presumed influence model. In particular, presumed media influence affected the perceived image of the settlements in the Israeli public opinion, which in turn affected three relevant and conceptually related outcome measures: justification of the use of violence (and consequently intentions to resort to violent protest), political inefficacy, and thoughts about residential mobility. Third-person estimations contributed indirectly to predicting these variables over and above factors tapping settlers' attachment to their places of residence and various ideological and demographic factors. These results extend the scope of the influence of presumed media influence theory into the domain of political protest and political legitimacy. The effects of presumed media influence, demonstrated in this article, point out that even behaviors such as participation in violent protest are affected by images and perceptions of media influence. What the current study shows is that in the context of a hotly debated political conflict, perceiving the image of one's group as negative reduces one's commitment to the political process, as evidenced by reduced feelings of efficacy and a willingness to consider violent alternatives to democratic forms of protest. At the same time, and somewhat paradoxically, feeling ostracized leads to a desire to dissociate one's self from the group by moving from the settlements.
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The theoretical interpretation of our findings utilizes theories stressing the role of illegitimacy in violent protest. Media coverage is perceived as part of the democratic political process. If the process is seen as biased and, therefore, tainted, one's commitment to it and to democratic outcomes is reduced. Thus, if the image of the settlements is seen as affected by negative coverage, it follows that the odds are seen as stacked against efforts to thwart the disengagement plan through other means of persuasion (e.g., debate or canvassing). This argument is supported by the effects of a negative image on efficacy and the willingness to support violence.
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A rival interpretation of the findings, perhaps more cynical than ours, is that negative coverage and media power serve not as a reason but as an excuse to justify resorting to violence, for people who are not very committed to democracy to begin with. According to this interpretation, the arrows in our path model should perhaps be in the reverse direction. Given the problem of equivalent models (see MacCallum, Wegener, Uchino, & Fabrigar, 1993) , structural equation modeling (SEM) does not offer us decisive causal evidence, and thus, our model cannot negate the possibility of reverse causation empirically. However, reverse causation can be indirectly tested using simple logic. If media are used as an excuse, then perceptions of media influence should be a function of how one views the likely outcome of the referendum. The need to blame the media and use them as an excuse should be much lower for settlers thinking that their side is about to win a majority of the vote, compared with those expecting to lose (see Duck, Terry, & Hogg, 1998) .
To test this notion, we used an item asking respondents to assess how they believed the majority of Likud members would vote. Respondents were offered four possible responses: "They will decide to support the plan" (i.e., to evacuate the Gaza Strip), "They will oppose the plan" "I don't know," and "half and half" (i.e., a tie). Those who believed the Likud would support the plan (and hence, that their side would lose the referendum) did not see the coverage as more negative (controlling for all covariates, b = .11, SE = .11, p > .10) or more influential (controlling for all covariates, b = .21, SE = .19, p > .10) than all other respondents. Because there is no evidence to support the notion of attributing perceptions of the negative coverage or its influence to a likely failure in the polls, it seems that the causal interpretation advanced by our model, and supported by research on the influence of presumed media influence, enjoys an advantage over the reverse mechanism.
How could presumed influence and perceived image positively affect wanting and thinking about peaceful relocation, and at the same time intending to use violence to resist evacuation? It is interesting to note, these logically opposite outcomes were also correlated at the zero-order level (bivariate r = .17, p < .001). A likely explanation for this seeming inconsistency is that perception of a negative image leads either to a justification of violence or to a desire to leave. In other words, there are two groups of settlers: those who feel that if they do not get support in public opinion then they should leave, and those who see the negative image as proof that the system is against them and that they are justified in preventing this injustice by whatever means necessary (especially because our item measuring justification mentioned that other means had been exhausted). An analysis of the data shows that of the 336 respondents who answered the "leave for a compensation" and "violence may be justified" questions, 67.3% either disagreed or strongly disagreed with both options, while only 2.4% agreed or strongly agreed with both. This suggests that, on the whole, people did not see the two options as compatible; however, rather negative image was associated with one or the other possibility. When adding to the structural model that controls for all other factors possible paths from RMT to justification of the use of violence or intention to use violence, results showed insignificant associations. Thus, the constructs represent independent phenomena, and the bivariate significant correlations are probably spurious and caused by the fact that intention to use violence and RMT are predicted by perceived image, and the presumed influence process, and by the fact that there are many who responded negatively to both constructs.
It is interesting to note, settlers on the whole did not see their image as negative. On a scale of 1 to 5 with 5 representing the most negative image, the mean perceived image was only 2.52, SD = 1.05, well under the midpoint. Given their perceptions of the press coverage as very negative (on a 1 to 5 scale with 5 representing the most negative: M = 4.3, SD = .74), and their belief in the media's power (M = 4, SD = 1), this is surprising. One explanation is that although respondents believed that media coverage is influential, it is seen as unrepresentative of the public's view. Another possible explanation (in line with Gunther et al., 2001 ) is that they believe that without the biased media coverage, their image would be much better.
The results of the current study highlight the centrality of perceived image as a mediator between perceptions about media coverage and power and the outcome variables. In a way, the path between perceived influence and perceived image is conceptually similar to that suggested by research on the "persuasive press inference" (Gunther, 1998) . This is because our dependent variable is conceptually similar to Gunther's (1998) perceived climate of opinion; however, unlike perceived opinion climate, the focus of the current study was on attitudes toward the reference group that respondents belong to, not public opinion in general, on a given topic. It is worthwhile to note that perceptions of media bias and influence are not the sole predictors of perceived public opinion, and that our models show that perceived image is influenced by ideological factors (probably reflecting more extreme respondents' "projection" of their attitudes on the environment; see Fields & Schuman, 1976) , and demographic factors (e.g., secular respondents perceived the settlers' image to be significantly more negative than those who defined themselves as religious or traditional), 7 whose effect probably represents the influence of social networks on perceived public opinion (in line with Tsfati, 2001 ). Our survey was in the field just days before a crucial vote was about to decide on whether respondents were going to be removed from their homes. It is rather clear that results are not generalizable to every minority-majority context. The settlers were responding to an issue with which they were highly and most personally involved. For some of these settlers, the conflict is not only about preserving their homes and lifestyle but also about a deeper set of ideological beliefs. Many settlers came to the Gaza Strip settlements because they thought they were fulfilling God's will as part of a process of salvation of the Jewish people. Evacuation for them is going against God's will and perceived as a threat to their Messianic redemption. Although these conditions are rather extreme and unique, we believe that similar processes probably operate under more common conditions involving violent protest. Future research is needed to test the boundaries of our claims.
The results of the current study highlight the importance of our beliefs about media representations of political issues and their presumed influence. If earlier research demonstrated that perceptions of media influence are important in shaping various aspects of social life, the current data show that these perceptions shape citizens' sense of the legitimacy of the democratic process. In this sense, the current study identifies an additional important, yet indirect, pathway through which media affect political life. This pathway might serve as a testimony to the importance of media processes in the effort to maintain the boundaries of the democratic conduct.
Research about the "hostile media phenomenon" (Giner-Sorolla & Chaiken, 1994; Vollone, Ross & Lepper, 1985) suggests that almost any group, not only extreme ones, perceives itself as being treated unfairly by media and feels that this biased coverage affects public opinion. 8 In this way, hostile media perceptions, in general, work to undermine political legitimacy, at least to some extent. Our findings show that under extreme circumstances, and when the coverage is perceived as especially biased and detrimental for respondents' ideology and way of life, such a bias may ultimately lead people to rationalize the breaking of democratic rules and even lead to justifying violence. The practical implication of the findings for adherents of democratic values is, perhaps, that media systems should aim at minimizing perceptions of negative and biased coverage and of media power over society. One way of doing this is perhaps to provide even extreme and marginal groups with at least some media access, and making sure that their arguments are represented in media coverage. Although no change in media practices will negate subjective perceptions of bias, and although settlers perceived hostile coverage in this case, despite the fact that quantitative content analysis (Sheafer, 2005 ) demonstrated a relatively balanced coverage of the debate regarding the disengagement plan, journalists should still aim at providing a voice for various groups and views in as fair and inclusive a way possible. Trying to correct feelings of media deprivation may not eliminate the aggravation of this and other groups about their inability to persuade public opinion; however, it may help to decrease the intensity of these feelings. Another possibility for adherents of democratic values is to target the feeling that media coverage is highly influential. It is a difficult challenge to bring public perceptions of media influence more in line with decades of research that find this power to be limited; however, our findings suggest that it is an important and necessary challenge.
Appendix A Model Building and Trimming
The purpose of the analysis that follows was to determine whether for each of the triads implying mediational relationships at the core of our model, adding the mediational paths improves the fit of the model and whether the direct path from the independent variable to the dependent variable should be retained. The strategy we used is based on comparison of the chi-square difference test, which is simply "the difference of the χ 2 values of two hierarchical models" (Kline, 1998, p. 133) , with degrees of freedom equaling the difference between the degrees of freedom in the respective models. For each triad, we first compared a model containing a direct path only, referred to as Model 1 in Figure 2 , to a model containing the direct and mediational paths (the paths from the independent variable to the mediator, and from the mediator to the dependent variable) referred to as Model 2. Because a significant result in model building supports the retention of the added paths, in this test a significant result means evidence in favor of mediation.
In the next stage, we compared Model 2 with yet another model, this time with no direct path from the independent to the dependent variable (referred to in Table 3 as Model 3). In this case, a significant χ 2 suggests that the model has been simplified too much, and a nonsignificant result supports the simpler model because it is not appreciably worse than a more complex model. Readers should note that Models 1 and 3 could not be compared directly, given that they are not nested models. Results, reported in Figure 2 supported the inclusion of an indirect path (as indicated by the significant χ 2 differences when comparing Models 1 and 2 in each of the triads), and the exclusion of the direct path (as indicated by the insignificant χ 2 differences when comparing Models 2 and 3 in each of the triads). Similar analyses were performed (unreported here) to test the utility of the mediational paths and direct paths for the less central aspects of our model (in the triads involving negative coverage, and perceived influence on self). Based on these tests, and on the theoretical justifications in the model specification section, the direct path from perceived negative coverage and perceived image was retained. The direct paths from perceived influence on self and negative coverage to the dependent variables were also excluded based on these chisquared difference tests. 
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